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Civil Procedure.  Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, 
Inc., 212 A.3d 594 (R.I. 2019).  Neither the discovery rule, 
fraudulent concealment, nor the continuing violation doctrine could 
toll the statute of limitations for the plaintiff’s claims under the 
Rhode Island Wiretap Act and the Rhode Island Computer Crime 
Act. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Defendant, Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc. (ATC) 
employed the pro se plaintiff, Jason Boudreau (Boudreau) from 
2009 until 2011.1  Shortly before ATC terminated Boudreau, an 
ATC manager installed a surveillance software program2 on 
Boudreau’s work computer.3  Ultimately, the software revealed 
that Boudreau possessed child pornography.4  ATC disclosed this 
information to the Warwick Police Department and Boudreau was 
subsequently arrested and convicted for possession of child 
pornography.5  
After ATC fired Boudreau, he filed for unemployment 
benefits.6  At a January 2012 hearing before the Rhode Island 
Department of Labor and Training Board of Review, in front of 
Boudreau, ATC’s president testified and disclosed ATC’s use of 
tracking software on Boudreau’s computer.7 
In 2013, Boudreau filed a federal lawsuit against ATC’s 
president and others in the United States District Court for the 
1. Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594, 595–
96 (R.I. 2019). 
2. Id. at 596.  Namely, System Surveillance Pro.  This program captured
screenshots of the computer’s screen and then sent that information to ATC 





7. Id.  ATC’s president testified in some detail concerning the nature and
process of the program.  Id. 
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District of Rhode Island (the District Court).8  There, Boudreau 
alleged a violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.9  
During the course of the federal lawsuit Boudreau testified that he 
did not learn of the tracking software until the January hearing 
before the Labor and Training Board of Review (the 2012 
Hearing).10  Ultimately, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants.11 
In 2016, Boudreau filed the instant action in Rhode Island 
Superior Court alleging claims under the Rhode Island Wiretap 
Act, the Rhode Island Computer Crime Act, the Rhode Island 
Software Fraud Act, and state privacy laws.12  ATC removed the 
case to the District Court and subsequently filed a motion to 
dismiss.13  The District Court found that the statute of limitations 
barred the federal claims and “remanded the remainder of the case 
to . . .  determine ATC’s motion to dismiss with respect to 
[Boudreau’s] state law claims.”14  The Superior Court, at 
Boudreau’s request, converted ATC’s motion to dismiss into a 
summary judgment motion.15 
ATC made the following arguments with respect to its motion 
for summary judgment: the applicable statute of limitations was 
three years in duration;16 Boudreau’s only possible injury occurred 
in June of 2011 and he did not file until August of 2016, meaning 
his claims were barred by the statute of limitations; even if the 
discovery rule applied, because Boudreau was, as a matter of law, 
aware of his claim at the 2012 Hearing, his claims remained time 
barred; and that fraudulent concealment could not toll the statute 
of limitations because ATC had made no express 
misrepresentations.17 
8. Id.  (citing Boudreau v. Lussier, No. 13-338 S, 2015 WL 7720503 (D.R.I. 








16. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14(b).
17. Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 597.
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The Superior Court, assuming the discovery rule applied, held 
that Boudreau became aware of his claims, at the very latest, at the 
2012 Hearing, that there was no evidence of fraudulent 
concealment, and thus granted summary judgment to ATC.18  
Boudreau timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court (the 
Court).19  
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court reviewed the Superior Court’s summary judgment 
ruling de novo.20  On appeal, Boudreau argued that the discovery 
rule, the fraudulent concealment doctrine, and the continuing 
violation doctrine, when applied to his case, resolved the statute of 
limitations bar by tolling the running of the statute.21  
Boudreau argued that he did not become aware of ATC’s 
conduct until August of 201322 and, if the discovery rule was duly 
applied, his case was not barred by the statute of limitations.23  The 
Court, however, disagreed.24  The Court determined that the 
relevant statute of limitations was three years from when 
Boudreau’s cause of action accrued.25  The general rule for accrual, 
the Court explained, is that the statute of limitations begins to run 
“at the time of the injury.”26  However, “when the fact of the injury 
is unknown to the plaintiff when it occurs, the applicable statute of 
limitations will be tolled and will not begin to run until, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, the plaintiff should have 
discovered the injury or some injury causing wrongful conduct.”27  
The Court cautioned that the discovery rule was only to be applied 
18. Id. at 597–98.
19. Id. at 598.  Boudreau brought claims against several other defendants,
but only his claim against ATC was before the Court on appeal.  Id. at n1. 
20. Id. (citing DeLong v. R.I. Sports Ctr., Inc., 182 A.3d 1129, 1134 (R.I.
2018)). 
21. Id.
22. The time at which he discovered the name of the software and its
functions.  Id. at 599. 
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14(b)).
26. Id. at 600 (citing Am. States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam, 69 A.3d 831, 840 (R.I.
2013)). 
27. Id. (quoting McNulty v. Chip, 116 A.3d 173, 181 (R.I. 2015)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). 
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in “narrowly defined factual situations.”28  The Court then held 
that the discovery rule was inapplicable to Boudreau’s claims, 
based on the particular circumstances of his case, because 
Boudreau knew of the alleged injury at time he was arrested.29  
Therefore, the statute of limitations barred Boudreau’s claims.30 
Boudreau’s next argument, that of fraudulent concealment, 
was also unsuccessful.31  Boudreau argued that ATC had concealed 
the existence of the injury from him and thus the statute of 
limitations was tolled.32  The Court, however, determined that 
there were insufficient facts to support the fraudulent concealment 
claim.33  It reasoned that although ATC “may not have not disclosed 
the details . . . of the software to plaintiff,” that “[did] not amount 
to a concealment of plaintiff’s claims.”34 
Lastly, Boudreau argued that the continuing violation doctrine 
tolled the running of the statute.35  Specifically, he argued that 
ATC unlawfully used the tracking software findings when ATC 
defended itself in Boudreau’s federal suit, which meant the statute 
of limitations should have been tolled until the last use of the 
information in May of 2018.36  The Court explained that the 
continuing violation doctrine applies to continuing or repeated tort 
injuries and tolls the statute “until the date of the last injury or the 
date the tortious acts cease.”37  With that in mind, the Court 
pointed out that it had only once previously applied this doctrine in 
a conversion and unjust enrichment case.38  The Court further 
explained that it had previously declined to extend the doctrine to 
an age discrimination claim when the underlying claim was itself a 
28. Id. (quoting Hill v. R.I. State Emp.’s Ret. Bd., 935 A.2d 608, 617 (R.I.
2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
29. Id.  The Court also concluded that, even if the discovery rule did apply,
it nonetheless could not save Boudreau’s claims.  Id. 
30. Id. at 601.
31. See id. at 602.
32. Id. at 601.




37. Id. (quoting 54 C.J.S. Continuing Torts § 223 at 258 (2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). 
38. Id. (citing Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87, 101 (R.I.
2006)). 
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“discrete act” and alleged further claims were merely “continuing 
consequences” of the initial act.39  In light of the Court’s sparing 
use of the doctrine, the Court determined that the continuing 
violation doctrine did not apply to the facts of Boudreau’s case.40  
Because the Court did not accept any of Boudreau’s arguments, it 
affirmed the Superior Court’s decision.41 
COMMENTARY 
The Court, in declining to extend the statutory tolling 
doctrines, emphasized a conservative approach to statute of 
limitations interpretation.  Further, although the Court expressly 
stated the narrowness of the discovery rule, the Court failed to give 
any guidance as to when the doctrine should rightly be applied.42  
The Court’s analysis made clear that these lifeline doctrines could 
only apply in narrow and discrete factual situations.43  
“The purpose of the statutes of limitations is to prevent stale 
claims from springing up at a great distance of time and surprising 
parties when all proper evidence is lost or the facts have become 
obscure from lapse of time, defective memory, death or removal of 
witnesses.”44  Further, “[t]he main purpose of the discovery rule is 
‘to protect individuals suffering from latent or undiscoverable 
injuries who then seek legal redress after 
the statute of limitations has expired for a particular claim.’”45  
While these purposes are not invoked on the facts of Boudreau, the 
Court’s narrow holding and analysis will prevent the application of 
tolling doctrines in situations that truly warrant such application. 
Ultimately the message to Rhode Island litigants is: if the statute 
of limitations has run, you are out of luck. 
39. Id. at 603.
40. Id. at 604 (“[T]he ‘discrete act’ that triggered plaintiff’s claim . . . took
place when ATC installed tracking software of his work computer in June 
2011.”).  ATC did not track Boudreau again and its use of the information to 
defend the federal lawsuit was simply a consequence of the initial tracking.  Id. 
41. See id.
42. See id. at 600.
43. See id.
44. Ripa v. Behan, No. C.A. NC 98-319, 1999 WL 1062187, at *2 (R.I.
Super. May 7, 1999) (citing 54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 3). 
45. Hyde v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 139 A.3d 452, 461 (R.I.
2016) (citing Sharkey v. Prescott, 19 A.3d 62, 66 (R.I. 2011)). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to extend the 
statute of limitations tolling doctrines46 to Boudreau’s claim both 
because the facts did not warrant their application and because 
these doctrines should rarely be applied. 
Sophia J. Weaver 
46. Namely the discovery rule, fraudulent concealment, and the
continuing violation doctrine. 
